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‘‘Student achievement, which is inextricably connected
to institutional success, must be measured by institu-
tions on a ‘value-added’ basis that takes into account
students’ academic baseline when assessing their
results. This information should be made available to
students, and reported publicly in aggregate form to
provide consumers and policymakers an accessible,
understandable way to measure the relative effective-
ness of different colleges and universities.’’
Quote from ‘‘A Test of Leadership,’’ the 2006 Report of the
U.S. Department of Education (the Spellings Commission)
on Higher Education
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A B S T R A C T
This paper develops a general methodology for measuring the value added of institutions of
higher education using commonly available administrative data. Our approach recognizes
the data limitations and selection problems inherent in higher education, and highlights
the challenges these issues pose for education policy. Combining information from
different administrative sources in the state of Texas, we follow the universe of Texas
college applicants from the time of application (pre-enrollment) through public college
and into the labor market. In speciﬁcations that do not control for selection, we ﬁnd large,
signiﬁcant differences across colleges in terms of persistence, graduation, and earnings;
however, these differences decrease substantially when we control for selection. In light of
the growing interest in using value-added measures in higher education for both funding
and incentivizing purposes, our methodology offers unique evidence and lessons for policy
makers.
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Recent years have seen mounting pressure on colleges
nd universities to measure and disseminate the value
hat they are adding to their students (see, e.g., Harnisch,
011). This outcomes-based culture recognizes foremost
he need for measures of value added that capture the
ausal inﬂuence of institutions on their students, which
ust take into account the fact that students enter
ollege with different academic backgrounds (Spellings,
006). Many government agencies – of both states in
he U.S. and other countries – are using or are
onsidering using quantitative measures of institutional
erformance to incentivize achievement and target
nding (Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, 2012; Jongbloed &
ossensteyn, 2001). For example, in the U.S., the state of
ennessee is currently using a performance-based
nding formula in higher education, and the state of
exas is considering using one (Wright, Fox, Murray,
arruthers, & Thrall, 2012); in the United Kingdom, there
 continual interest in using quantitative performance
dicators for public colleges and universities for funding
urposes (Johnes, 2012). However, there is a lack of
esearch that can guide policymakers towards an optimal
olicy.
In this paper, we discuss the unique challenges of
easuring value added in higher education and explore
he possibilities and limitations of using commonly
vailable student-level administrative data as the basis
r such measures. It proves useful to contrast the higher
ducation environment with that of primary and second-
ry education, a sector which is broadly characterized by
he use of yearly standardized test scores as the basis of
alue-added measures. While there is evidence that such
est-based value-added measures can indeed capture
ifferential performance of institutions and teachers
Kain & Staiger, 2008; Klein, Kuh, Chun, Hamilton, &
havelson, 2005), several differences render the whole-
ale importation of the K–12 model to higher education
practical.
First, year-on-year standardized tests are not gener-
lly administered in higher education.1 In their stead,
e must consider other quantitative outcomes of the
igher education process that are available in adminis-
rative databases. Three such outcomes of interest are
ersistence rates, graduation rates, and post-college
arnings.
Second, these available non-test outcomes are either
nly observed once (persistence or graduation) or only
bserved post-enrollment (earnings). As such, we cannot
se a within-individual differencing estimator – an
stimator which can be extremely useful in order to
olate the inﬂuence of speciﬁc factors in the education
process, such as teachers and schools, separately from pre-
existing student ability.2
Third, students deliberately and systematically select
into colleges.3 Combined with the lack of pre-enrollment
outcome measures, this selection problem makes it
difﬁcult to attribute student outcomes to the effect of
the college attended separately from the effect of pre-
existing characteristics such as motivation and natural
ability.
Fourth, college students intentionally specialize their
instruction, and institutions emphasize discipline-speciﬁc
knowledge (i.e., major speciﬁc knowledge). Such speciali-
zation calls for outcome measures that are comparable
across students with a wide range of learned abilities. In
this respect, standardized tests of general skills may not be
the optimal outcome measure.
Reﬂecting the unique context of higher education and
the availability of data, we propose a simple methodology
that provides estimates of the relative value added of
individual institutions: a student-level regression that
explains the variation in the outcome of interest through
(i) observable differences in pre-enrollment student
characteristics, (ii) unobserved differences in students’
preferences for schools and schools’ preferences for
students, captured by a student’s application and accep-
tance proﬁle, and (iii) ﬁxed effects for the college at which a
student is enrolled. This model yields average differences
in conditional outcomes across colleges, or relative value-
added measures; and these measures can be considered
causal value-added estimates to the extent that pre-
enrollment student characteristics and application/accep-
tance proﬁles control for differential selection into
colleges.
We implement this methodology using rich adminis-
trative records from the state of Texas, developing value-
added estimates for the state’s 30 traditional four-year
public colleges. Texas has one of the most-developed K–20
data systems in the nation and thus provides an ideal
setting to demonstrate the incremental beneﬁts of using
various student-level data sources to correct for selection,
while at the same time demonstrating the potential bias
that can result by not correcting for selection.
Our analysis shows that there are large mean differ-
ences in outcomes across public colleges prior to control-
ling for pre-existing student characteristics. For example,
the unconditional mean difference in earnings between
Texas A&M University and Texas Southern University – the
institutions with the highest and lowest unconditional
earnings, respectively – is 78 log points. Perhaps not
surprisingly, our analysis conﬁrms that value-added
measures change considerably upon controlling for pre-
enrollment student characteristics. Continuing the exam-
ple, controlling for the largest set of student characteristics
1 Some standardized tests in higher-education do exist, for example the
ollegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) test of general knowledge or the
RE Subject Tests of major speciﬁc knowledge; however, they are not to
2 Certain populations do have labor market experience prior to college
enrollment, facilitating student ﬁxed-effect models in labor market
earnings. For example, Cellini and Chaudhary (2012) study the returns to
private, two-year colleges, and Arcidiacono, Cooley, and Hussey (2008)
study the returns to MBA programs.
3ur knowledge administered regularly to all students in an administrative
nit (e.g., a state or country).
Sorting undoubtedly occurs in the primary and secondary setting as
well (Tiebout, 1956); presumably, however, to a much smaller degree.
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–7766d their unique application and acceptance proﬁle, the
fference in mean earnings between Texas A&M and Texas
uthern decreases to 30 log points. A similar pattern is
en when using persistence and graduation as outcomes,
d when comparing amongst various student subgroups.
Our work relates to several different literatures. A
mber of studies have used standardized test scores to
timate value added in higher education for select groups
 students and schools. For example, Klein et al. (2005)
ministered a test of cognitive skills to a small sample of
dents from diverse colleges in an effort to validate the
efulness of such tests; Liu (2011) compares the results of
o different methodologies that measure value added of
stitutions using standardized test scores; and Saavedra
d Saavedra (2011) use standardized tests administered
 a sample of Colombian college students to estimate the
lue added of a college education. Several papers have
o used earnings to estimate value added in higher
ucation. For example, Mallier and Rodgers (1995)
opose and estimate a measure that compares earnings
tween graduates and non-graduates in the United
ngdom, and Rodgers (2007) explores how this method-
ogy can be used to develop performance indicators for
hools.
When the outcome in question is earnings, we study the
me question as in the literature on the labor market
turn to college quality (see e.g., Andrews, Li, & Love-
eim, 2012; Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996;
ack & Smith, 2004; Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999;
ang, 2009). While this literature is mostly concerned
ith addressing selection into college, our work is unique
 estimating returns for individual schools, rather than
ing an index of college quality or selectivity (such as the
hool average SAT score).
Furthermore, our work also provides a practical
plication of the Dale and Krueger (2002) methodology
that controlling for the set of applications and
ceptances can help account for unobserved selection
to schools – and we show how value-added estimates
ffer with and without using applications and acceptances
 controls. Another recent example of the use of this
ethodology is Broecke (2012), who estimates returns to
llege selectivity for students in the United Kingdom.
This work is also related to a strand of literature that
es natural experiments which provide a locally exoge-
us selection rule into college to overcome the selection
oblem. For example, Hoekstra (2009) exploits a strict
T-score cutoff used for admission by a large ﬂagship
iversity to compare the earnings of applicants scoring
st above and below the admission cutoff, and Saavedra
009) exploits a sharp discontinuity in acceptance based
 a standardized college entry test in Colombia to
easure the effect of attending a better-quality school on
llege exit scores, employment, and earnings. While
tractive, discontinuities of this type are rare, reducing
e usefulness of this methodology for policymaking
rposes.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss in
ction 2 the value of higher education and potential
antitative indicators of value in this setting. In Section 3,
value added in higher education, and outline our empirical
model. Section 4 describes the context of our empirical
sample and the data we use. Section 5 presents results of
the analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Deﬁning value in higher education
2.1. Deﬁning the value of higher education to students
Colleges aim to produce a wide range of beneﬁts for
students.4 Perhaps foremost, colleges aim to increase
students’ individual utility: A college education imparts
knowledge and skills that increase students’ economic
productivity and hence their wages, and higher wages
allow for an expanded budget set of consumption-leisure
bundles.
Colleges also foster non-pecuniary beneﬁts, such as
offering greater choices in the type of work one performs,
an improved ability to make informed life decisions about
marriage, health, and parenting, and even perhaps an
increased sense of general happiness (Oreopoulos &
Salvanes, 2011). Furthermore, knowledge in and of itself
may have utility value for some – the ‘‘consumption value’’
of knowledge.
Finally, colleges foster positive externalities accruing to
society at large, beneﬁts that students will enjoy through-
out their lives. These externalities operate through
increasing returns to knowledge, returns that are increas-
ing in the proximity of other knowledgeable people, such
as in ﬁrms (Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001) or cities (Moretti,
2004). Similarly, well-informed citizens are more likely to
contribute to public goods that improve the functioning of
civic society, through acts such as voting and supporting
free speech (Dee, 2004).
These wide-ranging goals of higher education suggest a
role for multidimensional performance measures. Our goal
in this paper is not to suggest the particular outcome
measures that should be used to measure value added in
college; rather, we argue that a full appraisal of institu-
tional performance at the postsecondary level likely
requires a set of indicators that proxy for the various
dimensions of institutional performance, and this set of
indicators is necessarily limited by data availability.
2.2. Student-level outcomes to measure institutional
performance
In this light, we summarize potential student-level
outcomes that could be used to measure dimensions of
institutional performance, noting both their advantages
and disadvantages, as well as their availability in common
administrative databases.
2.2.1. Standardized tests
Test scores are a succinct and practical way to assess
knowledge; compared year-to-year, they provide a useful
measure of knowledge gains. Indeed, standardized tests
4 For a more in depth survey of research on the affect of college on
dents, see Pascarella and Terenzini (2005).e discuss the empirical challenges in the measurement of stu
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–77 67ave been developed to measure both general and speciﬁc
nowledge in higher education. Tests of general knowl-
dge in higher education include, amongst others, the
ollegiate Learning Assessment (CLA), ACT’s Collegiate
ssessment of Academic Proﬁciency (CAPP), and ETS’s
easure of Academic Proﬁciency and Progress (MAPP).
xamples of tests of speciﬁc knowledge include ETS’s
ajor Speciﬁc Tests and GRE subject tests for certain
isciplines. Aside from certain licensure exams, such as for
ccountants or nurses, neither general nor speciﬁc tests are
urrently applied to a student body in the U.S. as general
ractice.
While the use of these tests in the future as a basis for
easuring value added is appealing, one issue that will
kely complicate their use is that many students drop out
f college, and differential attrition across schools could
ake it difﬁcult to use school average test scores of general
kills in a meaningful way. A separate issue is that it is
nclear how to compare gains in knowledge across
isciplines.
.2.2. Grade point average (GPA)
GPA or individual course grades are a natural consid-
ration as outcomes of student performance, and they are
enerally included in administrative databases. However,
rades are commonly normalized within a class to a
redetermined distribution; as such, it is difﬁcult to
ompare them within schools (speciﬁcally, across majors)
r across schools. For example, consider comparing an ‘‘A’’
 calculus courses at two different colleges, when it is
nown that one teaches a more rigorous course.
.2.3. Graduation and persistence
Whether a student persists through college and
ltimately graduates is certainly of interest to policy-
akers. One appeal of graduation rates as an indicator of
e value obtained in college is that the degree granting
rocess standardizes to some extent the knowledge and
kill levels deemed necessary to receive that degree. What
 unclear, however, is the extent to which obtaining a
ollege degree informs us of the quality of the knowledge
nd skills the student acquired while in school. Nonethe-
ss, graduation and persistence data are commonly
vailable in administrative databases, and, in fact, com-
letion rates are currently incorporated in several U.S.
tates’ performance-based funding models (Midwestern
igher Education Compact, 2009).
One limitation of graduation rates is that they are
bserved many years after a student initially enrolls in
chool, which introduces a long time lag between any
hanges in policy and the observation of that policy’s
ffect. Naturally, one-year persistence rates overcome this
mitation and allow for more immediate policy feedback.
.2.4. Wages/earnings
Wages are an attractive measure of achievement in
ollege for several reasons. First, a simple theory of
ompetitive labor markets predicts that the wage rate
quals a worker’s marginal product: The more a worker
dds to the value of a ﬁnal product, the higher her wage
ill be. Higher wages signal high productivity, and
productivity is increased through knowledge and skills,
which can be learned in college.
Second, unlike tests, the wage rate aggregates the
inﬂuence of both general and speciﬁc skills in accordance
with their importance for economic productivity. For
example, a nurse’s wage reﬂects general and speciﬁc skills,
say communication skills and wound-care skills, while a
civil engineer’s wage reﬂects her general and speciﬁc skills,
say problem-solving and design skills. Therefore, in a
perfectly competitive labor market, any two workers with
the same wage are equally productive despite having
different occupations. Finally, wages can be observed both
for those who graduate from college and those who do not.
Thus, one’s wage not only reﬂects their productivity, but also
reﬂects any possible graduation effect (a ‘‘sheepskin’’ effect).
Labor markets, however, may not be perfectly compet-
itive, and the wage rate becomes less attractive as a
measure of value to the extent that market frictions exist.
For example, unionized occupations may receive wages in
excess of their productivity. Furthermore, several other
disadvantages of wages as a measure of the value of
education can be identiﬁed: if workers are intrinsically
motivated, as is often the case in the nonproﬁt sector, then
wages do not fully reﬂect productivity; wages are only
observed for those who work, which excludes, for example,
home care; and the social beneﬁts of education, such as
civic-mindedness, are likely not reﬂected in wages.
In addition, we typically do not observe wage rates in
administrative databases, but rather, earnings over some
time period (a quarter or year). Earnings are less attractive
than wages, as they combine both the wage rate and the
labor supply decision. Several other disadvantages of the
use of earnings are of note. First, earnings data that can be
matched at the individual level to educational databases
usually come from state unemployment records that only
include earnings from jobs that are eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) beneﬁts. These include the majority of
earnings from wages and salaries, but exclude other
sources, such as self-employment income. UI records also
exclude earnings from federal government jobs, including
those in the military. UI earnings thus systematically
underreport total earnings, and this is a concern if students
who attend some institutions are more likely to generate
earnings from uncovered sources than are students who
attend other institutions.
Second, any state-level earnings database only contains
earnings information for jobs held within the state,
implying that we can only use such databases to track
the earnings of college students who maintain residence in
the state. This is a concern if there is differential out-of-
state migration of students across colleges and students
who are employed out of state have systematically higher
or lower earnings than those employed in state. Finally, as
with graduation rates, there is a long time lag between
enrollment in college and the observation of labor market
earnings (usually after graduation).
3. Measuring value added in higher education
Consider a generic educational production function that
could be used to estimate differences in student outcomes
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–7768ross schools when the outcome of interest is observed
e-enrollment:
s ¼ dYi;PRE þ FXi;PRE þ
Xn
s¼1
bsEs þ eis (1)
are a set of indicators for enrollment at various colleges s,
is an outcome for student i who attended school s, Yi,PRE
the pre-enrollment value of the outcome measure, and
,PRE is a vector of observable pre-enrollment student
aracteristics. It would be convenient if the coefﬁcients bs
ere interpretable as the school-average, over-time
ange in the outcome that is attributable to the effect
 attending the school in question. However, such a causal
terpretation can be confounded for several reasons.
First, students may select into colleges in ways that are
th unobservable to the analyst and correlated with the
tcome of interest, even conditional on Yi,PRE and Xi,PRE.
r example, students are likely to have private knowledge
out their future career goals that is not reﬂected in their
servable actions when applying to schools, and they are
ely to select colleges that best advance those career
als. Indeed, this type of self selection into colleges is
tively encouraged by guidance counselors, teachers, and
rents alike.
Second, pre-college outcome measures, Yi,PRE, are often
t observed (as is often the case with standardized test
ores or earnings) or do not exist (as with indicators of
rsistence and graduation). Thus, we are forced to
timate:
s ¼ FXi;PRE þ
Xn
s¼1
bsEs þ eis (2)
d we must rely solely on Xi,PRE to capture unobserved
lection effects that may be correlated with outcomes and
hool choice. Furthermore, the lack of pre-enrollment
tcome measures implies that bs in Eq. (2) reﬂects the
lative differences in outcomes across schools (as opposed
 within school changes over time).5
Third, the outcome of interest may not be observed for
 students. For example, students may be absent on the
y of a standardized test; earnings may not be observed if
student moves out of the state in which they attended
hool; or students may transfer to different colleges not
vered by the database at hand. Differential observability
 outcomes may bias estimates of bs.
Thus, barring pre-enrollment data on the outcome of
terest, a causal interpretation of bs relies on both Xi,PRE
equately controlling for selection into colleges and
suring that outcomes are observed for all enrollees. In
actice, we argue that Xi,PRE should include all observable
aracteristics available to the researcher that inﬂuence
e choice of college and the outcome of interest. Typical
aracteristics available in administrative datasets include
gender, ethnicity, high school course achievement (courses
and grades), and standardized test scores (e.g., SAT scores).
Certainly, some observable variables available to the
researcher have been affected by the student’s choice of
college; for example, the choice of major or participation in
sports or activities. If such variables are included in Xi,PRE,
estimates of bs would exclude the direct effect of these
variables on the outcome of interest. It may certainly be of
interest to estimate models conditioning on post-enroll-
ment choices (such as one’s major), but such a model will
not yield the comprehensive value added of colleges. Thus,
variables that could be affected by college choice should
rightfully be considered as outcomes rather than covari-
ates.
3.1. Controlling for selection on observables
One set of conditioning variables deserves particular
discussion: the set of schools to which a student applied
and was accepted. Dale and Krueger (2002) argue that
conditioning on this proﬁle of applications and accep-
tances captures information about the selection process
that would otherwise be unobserved by the researcher.
Speciﬁcally, they argue that students use private informa-
tion to optimize their college application decisions, and
colleges use information unobservable to researchers
(such as the quality of written statements and letters of
recommendation) to make acceptance decisions. Thus,
students with identical college application and acceptance
proﬁles are likely to be similar on both observable and
unobservable dimensions.
Of course, even controlling for application and accep-
tance proﬁles is unlikely to perfectly describe selection
into college. In particular, this identiﬁcation strategy
essentially compares students with the same observable
characteristics who applied to and were accepted at the
same set of colleges, yet decided to attend different
colleges. It would be naı¨ve to believe that this ultimate
choice of which school to attend was uncorrelated with the
outcomes of interest.
4. Data and sample
4.1. Higher education in Texas
We demonstrate the applicability of this value-added
model using rich administrative data from the state of
Texas that tracks students from high school, through
college, and into the labor force. For at least two reasons,
Texas is an excellent setting to estimate these models.
First, it is a large and diverse state that closely mirrors the
demographic and socio-economic make-up of the U.S.
population. Second, the vast majority of Texans attend
college in state; for example, 88 percent of Texas high
school graduates who enrolled at a four-year college in
2002 enrolled at a Texas public college (Snyder, Dillow, &
Hoffman, 2007). This second characteristic helps mitigate
sample selection issues that would likely be far more
problematic in a smaller state where students tend to
migrate out of state either for college or to work after
graduating.
An alternative speciﬁcation that includes high school graduates who
ver attended college would recover the absolute effects of attending a
rticular college (over not attending college); however, this speciﬁcation
only available for outcomes that are observed even if one does not
end college, such as earnings.
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–77 69Our analysis focuses on the 30 traditional public four-
ear universities in the state during our sample period,
hich includes the entering ﬁrst-year cohorts of the 1998–
002 academic years.6,7 These traditional four-year
niversities can be grouped into three main categories:
agship institutions, emerging research institutions with
tatewide draw, and regionally focused institutions.
The two ﬂagship institutions, the University of Texas at
ustin and Texas A&M University at College Station, are
ationally recognized Ph.D.-granting research institutions
at offer a comprehensive set of majors and draw a
iverse range of students from across the state and nation.
he six emerging research institutions are major Ph.D.-
ranting institutions that draw their students mainly from
ithin the state and also offer a comprehensive set of
ajors. These include Texas Tech University, University of
exas at Arlington, University of Texas at San Antonio,
niversity of Texas at El Paso, University of Texas at Dallas,
niversity of Houston, and University of North Texas. The
emaining 22 public four-year institutions generally do
rant Ph.D.s, but they vary in major and course offerings
nd tend to attract students from within their geographical
egion. Online Appendix Table 1 lists all of the schools
cluded in our analysis and summarizes several addition-
l institutional details.
The application and admissions process at Texas four-
ear public colleges is similar to the process in most other
tates. Students may submit application packages to as
any institutions as they desire, and a common applica-
on is accepted at all Texas public institutions. The
ommon application includes the high school transcript
nd some basic demographic information. Students
eparately submit their entrance exam scores (e.g., the
AT) via the relevant testing agency. Certain institutions
lso require institution speciﬁc material, such as one or
ore essays and/or letters of recommendation.
Institutions consider a number of factors when deciding
hether to admit a student, but most weight is placed on
e applicant’s high school GPA and entrance exam score.
ypically only the selective institutions place much weight
n other factors including student extracurricular activi-
es during high school, essays or letters of recommenda-
ons.
.2. Data
Our data come from various administrative agencies in
exas, and are housed securely by the Texas Higher
ducation Coordinating Board (THECB). THECB collects
formation on all individuals who apply to or attend any
ollege in the state, including indicators of which school(s)
 student applied to and whether or not she was accepted,
the number of credit hours a student was enrolled for each
semester, and whether or not she graduated.
To this collegiate database, we merge three other data
sources at the individual level using students’ Social
Security Numbers (SSN). Data on Texas public high school
graduates is provided by the Texas Education Agency
(TEA), which includes courses taken, programs participat-
ed in, an indicator of belonging to a low-income family
(eligibility for free school lunch), a TEA-deﬁned indicator
for being at risk of not graduating high school,8 and the
student’s gender and race/ethnicity. SAT score data is
purchased from the College Board, as is survey data
collected at the time of the test, which includes self-
reported GPA, class rank, planned educational attainment,
and father’s and mother’s education level. Finally, quar-
terly earnings data come from the state’s Unemployment
Insurance (UI) beneﬁts program, which is available for all
workers employed in beneﬁts-eligible jobs in the state.9
While some employment in Texas is excluded from the
Texas UI database (e.g., self-employment, certain exempt
occupations), there is evidence that the vast majority of
employment is included (see Stevens (2002) for details).
We note that this database contains all of the data that
is observed by university selection committees, except for
entrance essays, letters of recommendation, and a
student’s set of extracurricular activities, when these
factors are required.
4.2.1. Outcome variables
Using this data, we deﬁne several outcome variables. A
student is deﬁned as graduating from college if she
receives a bachelor’s degree at any public or private
four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic
year after graduating from high school. Similarly, we deﬁne
a student as persisting into year two of college if she
completes at least 30 credit hours at any public or private
four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic
year after graduating from high school.
Note that these deﬁnitions allow for transfers within
the Texas public school system, yet attribute the effect of
graduating/persisting to the school of initial enrollment (as
long as that initial enrollment was at a public four-year
college). This choice of deﬁnitions is consistent with the
principle espoused previously that any outcome subse-
quent to initial enrollment is rightfully attributable to the
effect of the ﬁrst school attended.
6 We do not include ﬁve non-traditional four-year public universities
ul Ross University Rio Grande College, University of Houston-Clear Lake,
niversity of Houston-Victoria, University of North Texas Dallas, and
exas A&M Texarkana) and one university that opened in the middle of
ur sample period (UT Brownsville).
7 Due to a lack of data, we do not consider private colleges nor two-year
8 The indicator for being at risk of not graduating high school takes a
value of one if a student has any of a set of characteristics identiﬁed by the
TEA as predicting high school drop-out; examples include failing at least
two courses in the basic high school curriculum, being retained within
grade, being pregnant or a parent, having been expelled, or being on
parole. For a comprehensive list of characteristics that deﬁne the ‘‘at risk’’
indicator, see the TEA data standards at http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/trex/
datastds/.
9 The unemployment insurance records in Texas – as well as many
other states – also indicate the industry of the employer in each job held
by an individual worker. Unfortunately, this information is not
particularly useful for our purposes, as it is impossible to distinguisholleges, although in principle the methodology we propose can be
qually applied to any class of institutions.
between occupations within an industry (for example, accountants,
engineers, and custodians are not distinguishable within the oil industry).
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–7770Furthermore, the choice of time horizon for persistence
d degree completion involves a tradeoff: a short horizon
ill exclude students with longer-than-normal college
reers, while a long horizon introduces a large lag
tween the action of institutions and the measurement
 student response (i.e., graduating), thus reducing the
ility of value-added measures for policymaking pur-
ses. While a six-year completion window is consistent
ith much of the academic literature, policymakers must
cessarily weigh these competing demands in light of the
ntext at hand.
Annual earnings, converted to 2010 dollars using the
I-U, are calculated as the sum of quarterly earnings
ported to the state in the eighth calendar year after
aduating from high school. As with graduation and
rsistence, this choice of time horizon involves a tradeoff:
 the one hand, a longer time horizon ensures that all
dents have had sufﬁcient time to complete college and
 absorbed by the labor market; on the other, it also
creases the lag time between the actions of the
stitution and the measurement of the response.
An important limitation of using UI earnings data is that
e do not observe earnings for students who migrate out
 state, making it impossible to distinguish between those
dividuals who do not work, are not working in a beneﬁts-
gible job, or have moved out of state. Importantly, this
itation is not speciﬁc to Texas, as no state unemploy-
ent insurance commission tracks earnings across state
es. This issue of missing data can be problematic for our
oposed value-added methodology if there is a correla-
n between choice of school and having zero UI earnings.
ven this limitation, two options are available: (i) impute
issing UI data with zero earnings, or (ii) treat missing UI
ta as missing when constructing our measure of
rnings. We choose the latter approach, acknowledging
at the choice of approach is necessarily context speciﬁc
d will dictate the interpretability of resulting value-
ded estimates.
. Sample and summary statistics
Our empirical analysis uses data for students who
aduated from any Texas public high school between
98 and 2002 and subsequently enrolled in a Texas public
ur-year college. Note that this sample excludes the
proximately 21 percent of enrollees from several groups
r whom we do not have pre-enrollment data: students
at were home schooled, that attended a private high
hool in Texas, or that attended any high school out of
te.
Table 1 summarizes the data, for both the sample of all
rollees and only enrollees with non-zero UI earnings.
oking ﬁrst at the sample of all enrollees, annual earnings
mongst those with reported earnings) average about
7,000 dollars, 60 percent graduate within six years of
rolling, and 84 percent persist into year two of college
ithin six years of enrolling. We do not exclude students
at are enrolled in graduate school, or are still enrolled in
 undergraduate degree. While it may be desirable to
clude these students in certain contexts, we include
enrolling in graduate school or not graduating may be
inﬂuenced by one’s undergraduate experience.
The majority of the sample (60 percent) is white,
although there is a signiﬁcant Hispanic population.
Eighteen percent of the sample is low income, as indicated
by their eligibility for free lunch, about a third were at risk
of not graduating high school, and the average composite
SAT score of 1042 points is, not surprisingly, close to the
nationwide average (The College Board). The sample
excluding enrollees with zero earnings is observably
similar to the full sample, reﬂecting the heterogenous
composition of the zero-earnings sample, which likely
includes both low- and high-skilled individuals.
Note that SAT data is missing for about 23 percent of the
full sample, despite the fact that all of the colleges in our
sample required SAT scores for admission. It is likely that
these students incorrectly reported their SSN to the College
Board, and we include an indicator for missing SAT data in
the regression analysis below.
4.3.1. Application and acceptance proﬁles
Table 2 contains the distribution of the number of
applications students made to the 30 schools in our
sample. The vast majority of students (63 percent)
applied to only one school (and application and accep-
tance data provide no extra useful information for these
students). Also, very few students applied to more than
three schools. In order to characterize the sets of schools
that students applied to and were accepted at, we create
indicator variables as follows. For students who applied
to two or three schools, we create indicators for the
unique combinations of applications and acceptances,
yielding 2350 groups.10 For computational feasibility,
we create one indicator variable for students who
applied to four or more schools. Finally, for about ﬁve
percent of students, we do not observe an application
to any school. This missing information is likely due
to mis-reporting of a student’s SSN (our matching
variable) by colleges to the THECB, and we include an
indicator in regressions below for students with no
application data.
5. Results
We present estimates of Eq. (2) for three outcomes:
persistence, graduation, and earnings. For consistency, we
exclude the indicator for enrollment at Texas A&M
University in all models (Texas A&M graduates have the
highest unconditional earnings); thus, estimates of bs are
interpretable as mean differences in the outcome relative
to Texas A&M, conditional on the included covariates.
10 For students who applied to two schools, there are C302  3 ¼ 1305
possible combinations of applications and acceptances: for each of the C302
unique combinations of schools applied to, there are three possible
acceptance outcomes (accepted only at one school or the other, or
accepted at both schools). Using a similar logic, there are C303  6 ¼
24; 360 possible combinations of applications and acceptances for
students who applied to three schools. Amongst these 25,665 possible
combinations, only 2350 contain two or more students, a result stemminggely from the fact that students in Texas tend to not apply to regional
ools outside of their home area.em in keeping with the principle that the choice of
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We begin by examining how conditional earnings
hange upon controlling for successively more compre-
ensive sets of pre-college enrollment covariates. Table 3
displays bs from various speciﬁcations of Eq. (2) in which
the outcome is the logarithm of earnings eight years after
graduating from high school. Column 1 conditions only on
high-school graduation year ﬁxed effects, which absorb
any aggregate differences in earnings across years, such as
the effect of inﬂation or general macroeconomic shocks.
Thus, the coefﬁcients in column 1 can be interpreted (up to
an approximation) as the average percentage differences in
unconditional earnings of enrollees at various Texas
colleges, relative to enrollees at Texas A&M. For example,
UT Dallas enrollees earned on average 12 percent less than
Texas A&M enrollees, while Texas Southern enrollees
earned on average about 118 percent less than Texas A&M
enrollees.11 Perhaps not surprisingly, the relative differ-
ences in unadjusted log earnings correlate highly with
common perceptions of college ‘‘quality’’ published in the
popular press such as U.S. News & World Report or Barron’s
Magazine.
Furthermore, note that all of the estimates in column
1 are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the one percent
level; as such, we are fairly conﬁdent that average
Table 2
Distribution of the number of applications to Texas four-year
public colleges.
Number of applications Frequency Percent
0 11,812 5.42
1 136,680 62.77
2 43,377 19.92
3 17,081 7.84
4 5814 2.67
5 1879 0.86
6 588 0.27
7 221 0.1
8 113 0.05
9 54 0.02
10 or more 114 0.04
Total 217,733 100
Note: Sample includes all graduates of Texas public high
able 1
ummary statistics of outcome variables and selected control variables.
All enrollees Enrollees with non-zero earnings
Mean (s.d.) Obs. Mean (s.d.) Obs.
Outcomes
Annual earnings ($) 36,474 (41,910) 169,239 36,474 (41,910) 169,239
Graduated 0.60 (0.49) 217,733 0.61 (0.49) 169,239
Persisted into year 2 of college 0.84 (0.37) 217,733 0.85 (0.36) 169,239
Student demographics
Black 0.12 (0.33) 217,733 0.13 (0.34) 169,239
Hispanic 0.21 (0.41) 217,733 0.22 (0.42) 169,239
White 0.60 (0.49) 217,733 0.59 (0.49) 169,239
Other race 0.06 (0.25) 217,733 0.06 (0.23) 169,239
Male 0.45 (0.50) 217,733 0.44 (0.50) 169,239
High school variables
Courses and programs
English as a 2nd language 0.13 (1.07) 217,733 0.13 (1.05) 169,239
Gifted and talented program 0.38 (1.13) 217,733 0.37 (1.11) 169,239
Calculus 0.23 (0.44) 217,733 0.22 (0.43) 169,239
Pre-Calculus 0.24 (0.43) 217,733 0.25 (0.43) 169,239
Algebra 2 0.07 (0.26) 217,733 0.07 (0.26) 169,239
Biology 0.02 (0.13) 217,733 0.02 (0.13) 169,239
Chemistry 0.02 (0.14) 217,733 0.02 (0.14) 169,239
Physics 0.05 (0.22) 217,733 0.05 (0.22) 169,239
Student status
Eligible for free lunch 0.18 (0.38) 217,733 0.18 (0.39) 169,239
At risk of not graduating 0.29 (1.11) 217,733 0.29 (1.09) 169,239
SAT
SAT composite score 1042.1 (181.2) 167,581 1031.2 (178.2) 129,765
Notes: (1) ‘‘All enrollees’’ sample includes all graduates of Texas public high schools between 1998 and 2002 who ever enrolled in a Texas public college.
Enrollees with non-zero earnings’’ restricts the ‘‘All enrollees’’ sample to those who had strictly positive earnings reported in state Unemployment
surance records eight years after graduating from high school. (2) Annual earnings are calculated as the sum of quarterly earnings as recorded in Texas
ate Unemployment Insurance records in the eighth calendar year after graduating from high school, converted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U. If no
arnings are reported, the observation is treated as missing (see text). (3) Graduating is deﬁned as the student receiving a bachelor’s degree at any public or
rivate four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic year after graduating from high school. (4) Persistence into Year 2 of college is deﬁned as
e student completing at least 30 credit hours at any public or private four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic year after graduating from
igh school.schools between 1998 and 2002 who ever enrolled in a Texas
public college. 11 exp(0.78) = 2.18.
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–7772conditional earnings of students who initially enroll at
xas A&M are signiﬁcantly higher than those of
udents who initially enroll in any other four-year
blic institution in Texas. While this is useful informa-
n, we are ultimately interested in all pairwise tests of
niﬁcance between colleges. We return to discuss this
ue below.
The results in column 1 serve as a base case that can
 compared with models that control for selection into
lleges. Columns 2 through 5 sequentially add the
llowing sets of control variables: (i) race and gender
ntrols, (ii) high school ﬁxed effects and indicators for
urses taken during high school, (iii) SAT score and
rious student and family demographics collected by
the College Board, and (iv) application group ﬁxed
effects. The order of addition roughly reﬂects the likely
availability of data in administrative databases: race and
gender are likely available in any higher education
database; high school information requires coordination
with the state K–12 education agency; SAT information
must be purchased from the College Board; college
application data is increasingly common, but costly to
collect.
Our main interest is in how estimates of bs change upon
controlling for various covariates. Comparing across the
columns of Table 3, several observations are worth noting.
First, the range of point estimates shrinks as more controls
are added. For example, the absolute range is 0.78 in
ble 3
rnings differences of enrollees at Texas four-year public colleges. Conditioning on various subsets of observable covariates.
utcome = ln(earnings) ln(earnings) ln(earnings) ln(earnings) ln(earnings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T Tyler 0.24** (0.04) 0.23** (0.04) 0.15** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 0.01 (0.08)
exas Women’s U. 0.30** (0.03) 0.21** (0.03) 0.12** (0.03) 0.08** (0.03) 0.00 (0.05)
exas A&M U. – – – – –
exas Tech U. 0.18** (0.01) 0.18** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01) 0.00 (0.03)
. F. Austin State U. 0.28** (0.01) 0.25** (0.01) 0.16** (0.01) 0.12** (0.01) 0.01 (0.03)
arleton State U. 0.28** (0.02) 0.29** (0.02) 0.14** (0.02) 0.10** (0.02) 0.01 (0.05)
T Dallas 0.12** (0.02) 0.12** (0.02) 0.14** (0.02) 0.11** (0.02) 0.02 (0.05)
est Texas A&M U. 0.33** (0.02) 0.32** (0.02) 0.13** (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 0.03 (0.06)
. of North Texas 0.31** (0.01) 0.28** (0.01) 0.20** (0.01) 0.16** (0.01) 0.04 (0.03)
T Pan American 0.52** (0.01) 0.47** (0.02) 0.19** (0.03) 0.14** (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
AMU Galveston 0.21** (0.04) 0.21** (0.04) 0.17** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 0.04 (0.07)
AMU Commerce 0.36** (0.02) 0.33** (0.02) 0.25** (0.03) 0.20** (0.03) 0.05 (0.05)
exas State U. 0.24** (0.01) 0.23** (0.01) 0.13** (0.01) 0.10** (0.01) 0.05 (0.03)
T Austin 0.13** (0.01) 0.12** (0.01) 0.12** (0.01) 0.11** (0.01) 0.06** (0.02)
AMU Corpus Christi 0.31** (0.02) 0.29** (0.02) 0.17** (0.02) 0.13** (0.02) 0.07 (0.04)
. Houston State U. 0.29** (0.02) 0.25** (0.02) 0.18** (0.02) 0.14** (0.02) 0.07* (0.03)
amar U. 0.35** (0.02) 0.32** (0.02) 0.21** (0.03) 0.16** (0.03) 0.08 (0.04)
T Arlington 0.25** (0.02) 0.22** (0.02) 0.17** (0.02) 0.14** (0.02) 0.09* (0.04)
T Permian Basin 0.30** (0.04) 0.28** (0.04) 0.13* (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.11 (0.12)
. of Houston 0.26** (0.01) 0.21** (0.01) 0.20** (0.01) 0.17** (0.01) 0.11** (0.03)
rairie View A&M U. 0.59** (0.02) 0.41** (0.02) 0.28** (0.02) 0.23** (0.02) 0.12** (0.04)
AMU Kingsville 0.50** (0.02) 0.46** (0.02) 0.23** (0.03) 0.18** (0.03) 0.12** (0.04)
idwestern State U. 0.42** (0.02) 0.40** (0.02) 0.23** (0.03) 0.18** (0.03) 0.13** (0.05)
ngelo State U. 0.43** (0.02) 0.41** (0.02) 0.20** (0.02) 0.16** (0.02) 0.14** (0.04)
T San Antonio 0.40** (0.01) 0.37** (0.01) 0.24** (0.02) 0.19** (0.02) 0.14** (0.03)
. of Houston Dwtn. 0.42** (0.02) 0.33** (0.02) 0.22** (0.02) 0.17** (0.02) 0.14** (0.04)
ul Ross State U. 0.48** (0.04) 0.45** (0.04) 0.19** (0.04) 0.14** (0.04) 0.15 (0.08)
AMU International 0.41** (0.03) 0.36** (0.03) 0.26** (0.05) 0.20** (0.05) 0.18** (0.06)
exas Southern U. 0.78** (0.02) 0.60** (0.02) 0.43** (0.03) 0.37** (0.03) 0.23** (0.05)
T El Paso 0.63** (0.02) 0.58** (0.02) 0.40** (0.03) 0.35** (0.03) 0.27** (0.05)
ear FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ace FE, gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
.S. FE, H.S. demographics Yes Yes Yes
AT score, SAT demographics Yes Yes
pplication group FE Yes
bservations 169,239 169,239 169,239 169,239 169,239
djusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06
otes: (1) Sample includes all graduates of Texas public high schools between 1998 and 2002 who ever enrolled in a Texas public college and had non-zero
rnings reported in their state unemployment insurance record eight calendar years after graduating from high school. (2) The excluded school is Texas
M University. TAMU, Texas A&M University; UT, University of Texas. (3) High school demographics include indicators for enrollment in various courses
d programs (see text), eligibility for free lunch, and a school-deﬁned indicator of being at risk of not graduating. (4) SAT demographics include survey
estions collected by the College Board on a student’s subjective rank in high school, high school GPA, father’s and mother’s education level, household
ome, and planned educational attainment.
 p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–77 73olumn 1, 0.43 in column 3 and 0.27 in column 5. This
end could be explained by students selecting into
olleges according to innate ability (which leads to higher
arnings); for example, students with high innate ability
re more likely to attend Texas A&M, while students with
elatively lower innate ability are more likely to attend
exas Southern University. Therefore, controlling for these
redetermined covariates that are correlated with ability
educes the disparity in earnings across institutions
erceived to be of high or low quality, bringing the
stimates closer to the true causal effects of attending
articular colleges.
Second, some sets of covariates change resulting
stimates much more than others. For example, moving
om column 1 to column 2 – controlling for race and
ender in addition to year ﬁxed effects – changes
oefﬁcients much less than moving from, say, column 2
 column 3 – additionally controlling for high school ﬁxed
ffects and high school course-taking indicators.
Third, the model with the most comprehensive set of
ovariates currently available in Texas stands out because
any of the differences between Texas A&M and other
niversities become insigniﬁcant, as seen in column 5. This
ifference appears despite the fact that the application
roup ﬁxed effects only add information for the 37 percent
f the sample that applied to more than one school (see
able 2). The estimates in column 5 imply we cannot
tatistically distinguish differential value added across
chools in this model. While we do not believe that the
odel in column 5 has fully solved the omitted variable-
ias problem, it is likely that controlling for even more
ovariates that determine the selection process – such as
e quality of one’s entrance essays or letters of
ecommendation – will reduce signiﬁcant differences even
rther.12
.2. Signiﬁcant differences across colleges
While informative, Table 3 does not directly inform us
f the difference in earnings between all pairwise
ombinations of institutions. One way to summarize this
formation is demonstrated in Table 4, which contains a
atrix of p-values from pairwise tests of signiﬁcance of the
oefﬁcients in column 5 of Table 3, our preferred estimates
at match students on their college application and
cceptance proﬁles.
The columns and rows in Table 4 are ordered as in
able 3, by order of the highest conditional earnings from
e fully speciﬁed model, and these p-values are adjusted
using the Benjamini–Hochberg methodology (Benjamini &
Hochberg, 1995) to reﬂect the fact that multiple hypothe-
ses are being performed, an important consideration
considering that the probability of rejecting a true null
hypothesis is greater than the signiﬁcance level used for
each test. Comparisons between all colleges are now
visible and, for example, we cannot say with any degree of
conﬁdence that students attending UT Permian Basin, a
small regional college located in West Texas, earn less on
average than observationally equivalent students at any
other college. However, this is due to a large standard error
that is partially a result of the relatively small number of
students attending UT Permian Basin.
5.3. Outcomes: persistence and graduation rates
We now investigate one-year persistence rates and
graduation rates as outcomes. In the interest of brevity, we
display in Table 5 only results from the model that
includes the largest set of covariates used in column 5 of
Table 3; however, qualitatively similar patterns as in
Table 3 result from the successive addition of covariates
with persistence and graduation as outcomes. Columns 1
and 3 of Table 5 include all college enrollees, while
columns 2 and 4 contain only enrollees with non-zero
annual earnings (the same sample as used in the
preceding earnings models). For ease of comparison, we
order colleges in Table 5 as in Table 3.
5.3.1. Comparing across outcome measures
Focusing ﬁrst on columns 1 and 3, it is obvious that the
ranking of schools is different from the ranking in the
earnings regressions. For example, UT Tyler does
relatively poorly in conditional graduation rates (18
percentage points lower than Texas A&M), although it
had the highest conditional earnings in the state. On the
other hand, UT El Paso, for example, has the lowest
conditional earnings and persistence rate amongst all
public institutions in Texas.
It is important to note that different outcomes (e.g.,
earnings versus graduation rates) capture different parts of
the education production process and may lead to different
value-added rankings. Nevertheless, there is certainly a
correlation between persistence and graduation, in that
one must persist to graduate, and there is likely a
correlation between graduation and earnings, in that years
in college have a positive return in the labor market, at
least marginally. This correlation can be seen graphically in
Fig. 1, which contains pairwise scatter plots of the
coefﬁcients on the school ﬁxed effects from the earnings,
graduation, and persistence models, and in Panel A of
Table 6, which contains the matrix of correlation
coefﬁcients for the estimates from these three models.
The correlation is strongly positive between all the
measures, with the strongest association between the
graduation and persistence models.
It may also be of interest to think about the ranking of
schools in terms of their differential ability to add value
to their students. In this case, the rank correlation
between the different outcomes is of interest. Indeed, as
seen in Panel B of Table 6, the magnitude of the rank
2 The models in Table 3 pool together all cohorts in our data, which
creases the precision of value-added estimates, but comes at a cost of
ggregating the effects of any administrative policies that vary over time.
his tradeoff is important for policymakers interested in using value-
dded measures to incentivize short-term behavior. We show in Online
ppendix Table 2 that there is a moderate amount of movement in value-
dded estimates across cohorts in our data. As our model cannot isolate
hether this volatility reﬂects changes in administrative policy or natural
ariations in cohorts over time, this is further reason to think of
stitutional performance in terms of broad classiﬁcations of institutional
erformance, as opposed to speciﬁc ordinal rankings.
Table 4
p-values from tests of signiﬁcant differences between coefﬁcients on college enrollment indicators in the fully speciﬁed earnings model.
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UT Tyler .99 .99 .91 .94 .91 .86 .76 .78 .81 .78 .71 .64 .60 .60 .55 .49 .66 .39 .32 .33 .32 .25 .24 .28 .39 .21 .05 .03
Texas Women’s U. .99 .87 .92 .89 .83 .60 .69 .78 .68 .54 .43 .43 .41 .39 .27 .63 .17 .11 .17 .16 .09 .05 .11 .29 .10 .00 .00
Texas A&M U.
Texas Tech U. .78 .91 .85 .78 .37 .51 .74 .57 .24 .11 .24 .20 .21 .09 .60 .01 .01 .05 .05 .01 .00 .03 .24 .04 .00 .00
S. F. Austin State U. .95 .99 .91 .64 .76 .85 .75 .51 .33 .41 .32 .35 .22 .68 .06 .04 .11 .12 .04 .00 .06 .32 .07 .00 .00
Tarleton State U. .95 .90 .71 .78 .83 .77 .64 .52 .51 .49 .46 .35 .67 .21 .16 .20 .20 .11 .06 .15 .33 .12 .01 .00
UT Dallas .92 .78 .83 .88 .81 .71 .58 .57 .56 .51 .39 .70 .24 .20 .24 .23 .14 .09 .20 .37 .14 .01 .00
West Texas A&M U. .92 .95 .95 .92 .90 .81 .78 .78 .71 .64 .77 .49 .41 .43 .40 .29 .28 .35 .49 .26 .05 .03
U. of North Texas .95 .99 .97 .92 .78 .74 .72 .67 .48 .78 .24 .19 .27 .26 .14 .04 .20 .45 .17 .00 .00
UT Pan American .97 .95 .89 .74 .69 .69 .64 .49 .78 .26 .20 .21 .26 .14 .04 .20 .43 .15 .00 .00
TAMU Galveston .98 .95 .91 .85 .87 .81 .77 .81 .63 .54 .54 .51 .42 .41 .46 .56 .33 .11 .06
TAMU Commerce .97 .90 .83 .83 .78 .69 .81 .49 .39 .43 .41 .29 .24 .33 .51 .25 .03 .02
Texas State U. .84 .78 .78 .71 .55 .81 .27 .20 .29 .29 .15 .04 .20 .49 .18 .00 .00
UT Austin .91 .91 .83 .69 .85 .35 .27 .37 .37 .20 .06 .26 .54 .21 .01 .00
TAMU Corpus Christi .98 .94 .88 .90 .68 .54 .54 .54 .40 .29 .46 .64 .32 .04 .02
S. Houston State U. .91 .83 .89 .58 .43 .51 .49 .33 .23 .39 .61 .29 .02 .01
Lamar U. .94 .91 .78 .64 .67 .64 .49 .43 .54 .69 .39 .06 .04
UT Arlington .94 .83 .69 .71 .67 .51 .43 .58 .71 .41 .06 .03
UT Permian Basin .99 .95 .95 .93 .90 .91 .91 .90 .79 .58 .45
U. of Houston .85 .85 .81 .66 .60 .71 .81 .51 .06 .05
Prairie View A&M U. .97 .92 .81 .83 .87 .89 .64 .12 .09
TAMU Kingsville .95 .88 .90 .91 .91 .69 .24 .14
Midwestern State U. .92 .95 .95 .93 .77 .32 .20
Angelo State U. .95 .95 .98 .81 .35 .20
UT San Antonio .99 .95 .75 .21 .11
U. of Houston Dwtn. .95 .78 .29 .20
Sul Ross State U. .90 .63 .44
TAMU International .70 .49
Texas Southern U. .78
UT El Paso
Note: Cells contain Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values from pairwise tests of signiﬁcant differences between coefﬁcients on college enrollment indicators in the fully speciﬁed earnings model. This model
controls for year ﬁxed effects, student demographics from both high schools and the College Board, high school ﬁxed effects, SAT scores, and application group ﬁxed effects.
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utcome measures.
.3.2. Sensitivity to the choice of sample
The practical use of this value-added model requires
everal sample selection criteria; to name a few, whether
 include or exclude out-of-state enrollees in in-state
olleges, students in graduate school when earnings is the
utcome, or students with missing pre-enrollment cov-
riates. Importantly, such sample selection criteria may
ﬂuence resulting value-added estimates.
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the choice of sample
ith one example salient to our empirical context:
whether or not to include students with zero earnings
when using graduation and persistence as outcomes. There
is no a priori reason why we would want to exclude
enrollees with missing earnings when considering gradu-
ation or persistence, but if we are comparing estimates
from persistence and graduation rate models to earnings
models, it is useful to use the same sample. This sensitivity
can be seen by comparing column 1 with column 2, and
column 3 with column 4 in Table 5. In this case, despite
excluding about 22 percent of the sample, there is little
movement in the point estimates across the samples.
However, the general point remains that different samples
can lead to different value-added estimates.
able 5
raduation and persistence differences of enrollees at Texas four-year public colleges. Conditioning on the full set of observable covariates.
Sample = All enrollees Enrollees with non-
zero earnings
All enrollees Enrollees with non-
zero earnings
Outcome = Graduated Graduated Persisted to year 2 Persisted to year 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UT Tyler 0.18** (0.04) 0.15** (0.04) 0.08** (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)
Texas Women’s U. 0.10** (0.02) 0.07** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Texas A&M U. – – – –
Texas Tech U. 0.03** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
S. F. Austin State U. 0.10** (0.01) 0.08** (0.01) 0.08** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01)
Tarleton State U. 0.08** (0.02) 0.08** (0.02) 0.04** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02)
UT Dallas 0.06** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
West Texas A&M U. 0.14** (0.02) 0.12** (0.03) 0.07** (0.02) 0.05* (0.02)
U. of North Texas 0.10** (0.01) 0.09** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
UT Pan American 0.11** (0.01) 0.10** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01)
TAMU Galveston 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
TAMU Commerce 0.12** (0.02) 0.09** (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Texas State U. 0.04** (0.01) 0.04** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
UT Austin 0.04** (0.01) 0.04** (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
TAMU Corpus Christi 0.07** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
S. Houston State U. 0.06** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01) 0.04** (0.01)
Lamar U. 0.20** (0.01) 0.18** (0.02) 0.11** (0.01) 0.08** (0.01)
UT Arlington 0.13** (0.01) 0.12** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01)
UT Permian Basin 0.10* (0.05) 0.10* (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03)
U. of Houston 0.15** (0.01) 0.13** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Prairie View A&M U. 0.08** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
TAMU Kingsville 0.11** (0.02) 0.09** (0.02) 0.05** (0.01) 0.05** (0.02)
Midwestern State U. 0.14** (0.02) 0.12** (0.02) 0.05** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01)
Angelo State U. 0.15** (0.01) 0.14** (0.02) 0.08** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01)
UT San Antonio 0.18** (0.01) 0.17** (0.01) 0.08** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01)
U. of Houston Dwtn. 0.29** (0.02) 0.28** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Sul Ross State U. 0.17** (0.03) 0.15** (0.03) 0.09** (0.02) 0.07* (0.03)
TAMU International 0.13** (0.02) 0.11** (0.03) 0.12** (0.02) 0.10** (0.02)
Texas Southern U. 0.25** (0.01) 0.24** (0.02) 0.05** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01)
UT El Paso 0.22** (0.02) 0.21** (0.02) 0.12** (0.02) 0.11** (0.02)
Year FE, H.S. FE, application group FE,
SAT score, student demographics
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 217,733 169,239 217,733 169,239
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.10
Notes: (1) ‘‘All enrollees’’ sample includes all graduates of Texas public high schools between 1998 and 2002 who ever enrolled in a Texas public college.
Enrollees with non-zero earnings’’ restricts the ‘‘All enrollees’’ sample to those who had strictly positive earnings reported in state Unemployment
surance records eight years after graduating from high school. (2) Graduating is deﬁned as the student receiving a bachelor’s degree at any public or
rivate four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic year after graduating from high school. Persistence into Year 2 of college is deﬁned as the
udent completing at least 30 credit hours at any public or private four-year college in Texas by the end of the sixth academic year after graduating high
hool. (3) The excluded school is Texas A&M University. TAMU, Texas A&M University; UT, University of Texas. (4) Student demographics include high
hool variables (indicators for enrollment in various courses and programs (see text), eligibility for free lunch, a school-deﬁned indicator of being at risk of
ot graduating), and SAT variables (survey questions collected by the College Board on a student’s subjective rank in high school, high school GPA, father’s
nd mother’s education level, household income, and planned educational attainment.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
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In this paper, we have discussed the issues surrounding
e measurement of value added in higher education, and
e proposed a general methodology for measuring the
lue added of individual institutions using existing
ministrative data. Our empirical exercise estimates
lue-added models for the state of Texas considering
rsistence rates, graduation rates, and earnings as
tcome measures. We demonstrate how the choice of
th conditioning variables and the base sample can
ﬂuence value-added estimates, and we emphasize the
portance of statistically distinguishing value-added
timates between individual institutions.
Owing to the multidimensional objective function of
gher education institutions, it is unlikely that a single
tcome measure will fully reﬂect institutional perfor-
mance. Thus, we have argued that a system of multiple
metrics capturing various dimensions of institutional
performance is crucial to gain a full understanding of
overall institutional performance. We believe further
research should consider the usefulness of optimally
combining multiple measures of college performance,
perhaps along the lines of recent work in the health care
sector (e.g., McClellan & Staiger, 2000).
Regardless of the outcome in question, the interest in
value-added measures in part stems from a desire amongst
policymakers to incentivize performance, as is evidenced
by the current debate in many U.S. states. Importantly, our
results suggest that policymakers should use caution in
applying value-added methods of the kind we estimate for
incentivizing purposes or otherwise tie them to pay or
funding. We show that value-added measures change
signiﬁcantly upon conditioning on successively more
-
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Fig. 1. Scatter plots of the coefﬁcients on school ﬁxed effects in the earnings, graduation, and persistence models.
ble 6
rrelations between the school coefﬁcients (Panel A) and the rank-order of school coefﬁcients (Panel B) from the earnings, graduation, and persistence
dels.
anel A
Earnings model, coefﬁcient Graduation model, coefﬁcient Persistence model, coefﬁcient
arnings model, coefﬁcient 1.000
raduation model, coefﬁcient 0.640 1.000
ersistence model, coefﬁcient 0.467 0.666 1.000
anel B
Earnings model, rank Graduation model, rank Persistence model, rank
arnings model, rank 1.000
raduation model, rank 0.624 1.000
ersistence model, rank 0.455 0.800 1.000
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J.M. Cunha, T. Miller / Economics of Education Review 42 (2014) 64–77 77formation about the pre-enrollment characteristics of
tudents, and we argue that even conditioning on the most
omplete set of characteristics available is unlikely to yield
alue-added estimates that can be interpreted causally. As
uch, improperly designed measures have as much potential
 deceive as to inform about true institutional quality.
We have also shown that adjusting outcomes for
redetermined student characteristics often makes it
possible to statistically distinguish across many sets
f colleges. As such, we urge policymakers to think in terms
f broad classiﬁcations of institutional performance, as
pposed to speciﬁc ordinal rankings. One possibility is to
etermine a benchmark (e.g., a target graduation rate) and
lassify institutions relative to that benchmark (e.g.,
tatistically below, within normal statistical variance of,
r exceeding the speciﬁed benchmark).
Finally, experience with value-added measures in the
–12 sector has shown that institutions are likely to game
e system (e.g., Figlio, 2006), and there is no reason to not
xpect similar responses in higher education. For example,
 funding is tied to conditional completion rates, institu-
ons may lower grading standards in order to graduate
ore students or admit students with unobserved
ttributes that make them more likely to graduate. Policy
ust acknowledge and address such perverse incentives
hen developing and implementing value-added mea-
ures for higher education.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
und, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
econedurev.2014.06.001.
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